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Abstract
Many recent discussions on the conduct of monetary policy through
interest rate rules have given a very central role to inflation, both as an
objective and as an intermediate instrument. We want to show that
other variables like employment can be as important or even more. For
that we construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model where the economy is subject to demand and supply shocks.
We compute closed form solutions for the optimal interest rate rules
and find that they can be function of employment only, which then
dominates inflation for use in the policy rule.
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1 Introduction
In recent years both practical developments and academic discussions on
the conduct of monetary policy have given a very central role to inflation,
both as an objective and as an instrument. For example, whereas the Fed
takes interest rate decisions on the basis of several objectives, including in-
flation, employment and growth, the more recently established European
Central Bank is supposed to focus only on the fight against inflation. On
the academic side, following Taylor’s (1993) influential article, many authors
have studied interest rate rules where central bank policy is notably function
of inflation1. A particularly scrutinized issue has been the famous “Taylor
principle”, according to which the nominal interest rate should respond more
than one for one to inflation2. This principle is supposed to be the key to
both optimality and price determinacy.
Is this concentration on inflation warranted? We want to scrutinize this
issue in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model where the
economy is subject to both demand and supply shocks. We shall develop a
simple model for which we will be able to compute closed form solutions for
the optimal interest rate rules.
We shall find out that the optimal interest rate policy can be imple-
mented as a function of employment as an instrument. Using inflation as an
instrument would lead to much lower utility.
2 The model
2.1 The agents
We shall consider a monetary overlapping generations model (Samuelson,
1958) with production. The economy includes representative firms and house-
holds, and the government.
Households of generation t live for two periods, work Nt and consume
C1t in period t, consume C2t+1 in period t+ 1. They maximize the expected
value of the following two period utility:
Ut = αtLogC1t + LogC2t+1 − (1 + αt)Nt (1)
1The original Taylor contribution introduced both inflation and output as arguments of
the interest rate rule, but in subsequent writings the role of output has been overshadowed
by that of inflation.
2The coeﬃcient can actually be lower if the interest rate responds to other variables,
such as the output gap. See, for example, Woodford (2003).
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where αt > 0 is a demand shock. Households are submitted in each period
of their life to a “cash in advance” constraint:
M1t ≥ PtC1t M2t+1 ≥ Pt+1C2t+1 (2)
The total quantity of money is Mt =M1t +M2t. Since the young house-
hold starts his life without any asset, he has to borrow PtC1t from the bank
at the interest rate it in order to satisfy the cash in advance constraint.
Consequently the bank makes profits Λt, equal to:
Λt = itPtC1t (3)
To simplify calculations we assume that these profits Λt are redistributed
lump-sum to the young households.
The representative firm in period t produces output Yt with labor Nt via
the production function:
Yt = ZtNt (4)
where Zt is a technological shock common to all firms. We assume that the
firms belong to the young households, to which they distribute their profits,
if any.
2.2 Monetary policy and the optimality criterion
The central bank has essentially one policy instrument, the nominal interest
rate it. Monetary policy will be represented as an “interest rate rule” ex-
pressing formally how the nominal interest rate responds to various observed
variables.
In order to evaluate the optimality properties of potential interest rate
policies, we shall use the criterion proposed by Samuelson for the overlapping
generations model (Samuelson, 1967, 1968, Abel 1987) and assume that in
period t the government maximizes the function Vt:
Vt = Et
∞X
s=t−1
βs−tUs (5)
The sum starts at s = t − 1 because the old household born in t − 1 is
still alive in t. Rearranging the terms in the infinite sum (5), we find that,
up to a constant, the criterion Vt can be rewritten under the more convenient
form:
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Vt = Et
∞X
s=t
βs−t∆s (6)
with:
∆t = αtLogC1t +
1
βLogC2t − (1 + αt)Nt (7)
3 Market equilibrium
For the policy evaluations that will follow, we need to characterize first the
market equilibrium.
Consider first the problem of the old households in period t. We denote
by Ωt the financial wealth that the old households own at the beginning of
period t. With a hundred percent cash in advance constraint (formula 2),
their consumption C2t is given by:
PtC2t = Ωt (8)
Now let us write the maximization program of the young household born
in t. When young, the representative household receives wages WtNt, firms’
profits Ψt = PtYt −WtNt and central bank profits Λt. If he consumes C1t in
the first period of his life, he will have accumulated at the end of period t a
financial wealth Ωt+1:
Ωt+1 = (WtNt +Ψt + Λt)− (1 + it)PtC1t (9)
In view of (8), the expected value of LogC2t+1 is, up to a constant, equal
to LogΩt+1, so that the expected utility maximization program of the young
household in the first period boils down to choosing C1t and Nt so as to solve:
Maximize αtLogC1t + LogΩt+1 − (1 + αt)Nt s.t.
Ωt+1 = (WtNt +Ψt + Λt)− (1 + it)PtC1t
The first order conditions with respect to C1t and Nt are:
PtC1t =
αt
1 + αt
WtNt +Ψt + Λt
1 + it
(10)
Wt =WtNt +Ψt + Λt (11)
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Now the equilibrium condition on the goods market says that total con-
sumption must equal production:
C1t + C2t = Yt = ZtNt (12)
Using the definition of profits Ψt = PtYt − WtNt, and combining (3),
(8), (10), (11) and (12), we obtain, instead of (10) and (11), the simpler
expressions:
PtC1t =
αtΩt
1 + it
(13)
Wt = (1 + αt)Ωt (14)
Finally if firms are on their supply curve the price is equal to marginal
cost:
Pt =
Wt
Zt
(15)
We should finally note that, since central bank profits Λt are redistributed
to the households, Ωt will remain constant in time. Indeed, combining (3),
(8), (9) and (12), we obtain:
Ωt+1 = PtYt − (1 + it)PtC1t + Λt = PtC2t = Ωt = Ω (16)
For what follows we need the expressions of the Walrasian wage and price
P ∗t and W ∗t . From (14) and (15) these are:
W ∗t = (1 + αt)Ωt (17)
P ∗t =
(1 + αt)Ωt
Zt
(18)
4 Optimal interest policy: theWalrasian case
As a benchmark, we shall now compute the optimal interest rate policy in
the case where all markets clear.
Proposition 1: Under Walrasian prices and wages the optimal interest rate
rule is:
it = 0 (19)
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Proof : The central bank must choose the interest rate so as to maximize, in
each period and for each value of the shocks:
∆t = αtLogC1t +
1
βLogC2t − (1 + αt)Nt (20)
or, using (12):
∆t = αtLogC1t +
1
βLogC2t − (1 + αt)
C1t + C2t
Zt
(21)
We first note that C2t (equation 8) does not depend on the interest rate,
since P ∗t does not. Combining (13) and (18) we find that C1t is given by:
C1t =
αt
1 + αt
Zt
1 + it
(22)
Inserting this value of C1t into (21) and maximizing ∆t with respect to it
yields immediately (19). Q.E.D.
We see that, in the Walrasian case, no matter what are the shocks, the
interest rate should remain totally unresponsive and equal to zero. This is
actually the famous “Friedman rule” (Friedman, 1969).
5 Preset wages and the optimal rule
We will now move to the study of economies with nominal rigidities. We shall
begin assuming preset wages, and make the assumption, traditional in the
literature since Gray (1976), that the preset wage is equal to the expected
value of the Walrasian wage3, i.e.:
Wt = Et−1W ∗t (23)
In view of (17) this yields:
Wt = Et−1 [(1 + αt)Ωt] = (1 + αa)Ωt (24)
where:
αa = E (αt) (25)
3A number of authors have given microfoundations to similar formulas in a framework
of monopolistic competition. See, for example, Bénassy (2002).
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5.1 Equilibrium conditions
Since the wage is preset, equation (14), which reflects the labor supply be-
havior of the household, does not hold anymore, but the other equilibrium
conditions (8), (12), (13) and (15) are still valid. Combining them with the
expression of the preset wage (24) we find:
C1t =
αtZt
(1 + αa) (1 + it)
(26)
C2t =
Zt
1 + αa
(27)
Nt =
αt
(1 + αa) (1 + it)
+
1
1 + αa
(28)
5.2 The optimal interest rule
We shall now derive the optimal interest rate rule as a function of the shocks:
Proposition 2: Under preset wages the optimal interest rate rule is:
1 + it = max
µ
1, 1 + αt
1 + αa
¶
(29)
Proof : We have to maximize for all values of the shocks the quantity:
∆t = αtLogC1t +
1
βLogC2t − (1 + αt)Nt (30)
which, using (26), (27) and (28), is equal to:
∆t = αtLog
·
αtZt
(1 + αa) (1 + it)
¸
+
1
βLog
µ
Zt
1 + αa
¶
− (1 + αt)
·
αt
(1 + αa) (1 + it)
+
1
1 + αa
¸
(31)
Maximizing (31) with respect to it, and taking into account the fact that
it must be positive, we find (29). Q.E.D.
We should note that rule (29) does not allow the economy to reach a
“first best” situation. But it is the optimal rule subject to the constraint
that wages are preset.
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6 Employment as an instrument
Now generally the shocks are not observable and the policy maker must use
variables that will act as surrogates for the shocks (see, for example, Bénassy,
2003). Traditionally in this literature inflation is the principal instrument.
We shall now show that the level of employment can be used as a perfect
surrogate, whereas the use of inflation would lead to a suboptimal rule.
Proposition 3: Under preset wages, if employment Nt is used as an instru-
ment, the optimal interest rate rule is:
it
1 + it
= max [0, (1 + αa) (Nt − 1)] (32)
Rule (32) allows to reach the same level of utility as rule (29).
Proof : If the optimal policy (29) is used, we can compute, combining (28)
and (29), the level of employment:
Nt = min
µ
αt
1 + αt
+
1
1 + αa
, αt
1 + αa
+
1
1 + αa
¶
(33)
Inverting this relation, we can deduce the value of the demand shock αt
from Nt:
1
1 + αt
= min
·
1−Nt +
1
1 + αa
, 1
(1 + αa)Nt
¸
(34)
The optimal rule (29) can be rewritten:
1
1 + it
= min
µ
1, 1 + αa
1 + αt
¶
(35)
We insert the value of 1/ (1 + αt) in (34) into the optimal rule (29) , which
yields:
1
1 + it
= min
·
1, (1 + αa) (1−Nt) + 1,
1
Nt
¸
(36)
It is easy to check, using the fact that Nt > 1/ (1 + αa) (equation 33),
that the third term is always smaller than the minimum of the two first ones,
so that we can suppress it. Subtracting from 1 we obtain the optimal rule
(32). Furthermore, since there is a one to one relation between Nt and αt
(equation 33), this rule allows to reach the same utility as the optimal rule
in proposition 2. Q.E.D.
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7 Preset prices
We will now turn to the case of preset prices, and assume that the preset
price is equal to the expected value of the Walrasian price, i.e.:
Pt = Et−1P ∗t (37)
which, in view of the value of the Walrasian price (18), yields:
Pt = Et−1
·
(1 + αt)Ωt
Zt
¸
=
(1 + αa)Ωt
Za
(38)
where:
1
Za
= E
µ
1
Zt
¶
(39)
7.1 Equilibrium conditions
Since the price is preset, equation (15) does not hold anymore, but the other
equilibrium conditions (8), (12), (13) and (14) are still valid. Combining
them with the expression of the preset price (38) we find:
C1t =
αtZa
(1 + it) (1 + αa)
(40)
C2t =
Za
1 + αa
(41)
Nt =
Za
(1 + αa)Zt
µ
αt
1 + it
+ 1
¶
(42)
7.2 The optimal interest rule
We shall now derive the optimal interest rate rule as a function of the shocks:
Proposition 4: Under preset prices the optimal interest rate rule is:
1 + it = max
·
1, (1 + αt)Za
(1 + αa)Zt
¸
(43)
Proof : We have to maximize for all values of the shocks the quantity:
∆t = αtLogC1t +
1
βLogC2t − (1 + αt)Nt (44)
9
which, using (40), (41) and (42), is equal to:
∆t = αtLog
·
αtZa
(1 + αa) (1 + it)
¸
+
1
βLog
µ
Za
1 + αa
¶
− (1 + αt)
·
Za
(1 + αa)Zt
µ
αt
1 + it
+ 1
¶¸
(45)
Maximizing (45) with respect to it, and taking into account the fact that
it must be positive, we find (43). Q.E.D.
7.3 Employment as an instrument
We shall now see that we can express the optimal interest rate rule (43) using
employment as an instrument:
Proposition 5: Under preset prices, if employment Nt is used as an instru-
ment, the optimal interest rate rule is:
it
1 + it
= max
·
0, (1 + αa)ZtZa
(Nt − 1)
¸
(46)
Rule (46) allows to reach the same level of utility as rule (43).
Proof : If the optimal rule (43) is used, we obtain the level of employment
Nt, inserting (43) into (42):
Nt = min
·
αt
1 + αt
+
Za
(1 + αa)Zt
, αtZa
(1 + αa)Zt
+
Za
(1 + αa)Zt
¸
(47)
We can derive the value of the demand shock from Nt and Zt:
1
1 + αt
= min
·
1−Nt +
Za
(1 + αa)Zt
, Za
(1 + αa)ZtNt
¸
(48)
The optimal rule (43) can be rewritten:
1
1 + it
= min
·
1, (1 + αa)Zt
(1 + αt)Za
¸
(49)
Inserting (48) into (49) we obtain the optimal rule:
1
1 + it
= min
·
1, (1 + αa)ZtZa
(1−Nt) + 1,
1
Nt
¸
(50)
It is easy to check, using the fact that Nt > Za/ (1 + αa)Zt (equation
47), that the third term is always smaller than the minimum of the two first
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ones, so that we can suppress it. Subtracting from 1 we obtain the optimal
rule (46). Again because knowledge of Nt and Zt allows to recoup exactly
the value of αt (equation 48), rule (46) will allow to reach the same utility
as the optimal rule in proposition 4. Q.E.D.
In order to interpret more easily rule (46), let us rewrite it as a function
of Yt and Zt:
it
1 + it
= max
·
0, 1 + αaZa
(Yt − Zt)
¸
(51)
Under preset prices a large value of Zt creates a negative shock on em-
ployment, so it is natural to lower interest rates in such a situation. Now,
for given Zt, a high Yt signals a positive demand shock, and therefore calls
for an increase in the interest rate.
11
References
[1] Abel, Andrew B. (1987), “Optimal monetary growth”, Journal of Mon-
etary Economics, vol. 19, pp 437-450.
[2] Bénassy, Jean-Pascal (2002), The Macroeconomics of Imperfect Compe-
tition and Nonclearing Markets: A Dynamic General Equilibrium Ap-
proach, Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press.
[3] Bénassy, Jean-Pascal (2003), “Interest rate rules, inflation and the Tay-
lor principle: an analytical exploration”, Cepremap, Paris, forthcoming,
Economic Theory.
[4] Friedman, Milton (1969), “The optimum quantity of money”, in M.
Friedman (ed), The Optimum Quantity of Money and Other Essays.
London: Macmillan.
[5] Gray, Jo-Anna (1976), “Wage indexation: a macroeconomic approach”,
Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 2, pp 221-235.
[6] Samuelson, Paul A. (1958), “An exact consumption-loan model of inter-
est with or without the social contrivance of money”, Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 66, pp 467-482.
[7] Samuelson, Paul A. (1967), “A turnpike refutation of the golden rule in
a welfare-maximizing many-year plan”, in K. Shell (ed), Essays on the
Theory of Optimal Economic Growth, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.
[8] Samuelson, Paul A. (1968), “The two-part golden rule deduced as the
asymptotic turnpike of catenary motions”, Western Economic Journal,
vol. 6, pp 85-89.
[9] Taylor, John B. (1993), “Discretion versus policy rules in practice”,
Carnegie-Rochester Series on Public Policy, vol 39, pp 195-214.
[10] Taylor, John B. (1998), “Monetary policy and the long boom”, Federal
Reserve Bank of Saint-Louis Review, vol 80, n◦ 6, pp 3-11.
[11] Woodford, Michael (2003), Interest and Prices: Foundations of a Theory
of Monetary Policy, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
12
